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LITIGATING LABOR RIGHTS ACROSS A
DEMILITARIZED ZONE: THE SOUTH KOREAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AS A FORUM TO ADDRESS
LABOR VIOLATIONS IN NORTH KOREA’S KAESONG
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
Lavanga V. Wijekoon†
Abstract: South Korea heralds North Korea’s Kaesong Special Economic Zone as a
shining example of inter-Korean cooperation. South Korean corporations at Kaesong
combine South Korean expertise with North Korean labor. However, Kaesong
operations violate the North Korean workers’ labor rights.
This Comment explores the legal mechanisms available in South Korea to hold
violative South Korean Kaesong corporations accountable.
The South Korean
Constitutional Court should entertain a constitutional petition from the North Korean
workers. Such petition will compel the South Korean government to recognize the North
Korean workers’ rights under the South Korean Constitution and hold violative South
Korean corporations at Kaesong accountable through stricter regulations and sanctions.
Practical and procedural obstacles hinder Kaesong workers from pursuing relief in
the South Korean Constitutional Court. First, the North Korean government bars the
workers from leaving North Korea. Second, the South Korean Constitutional Court bars
third parties in South Korea from filing a petition on behalf of the workers. Third, the
court has no clear jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought by North Korean
workers in North Korea. Fourth, the court bars suit under pseudonyms, leaving potential
petitioners vulnerable to retaliatory employment action.
Given these impediments, the Constitutional Court and the South Korean legislature
should look to international developments in procedural law that facilitate transnational
rights litigation. The court and legislature should adopt new court procedures that permit
foreign petitioners physically absent in the jurisdiction to file in the Constitutional Court.
Further, the South Korean government and South Korean shareholders of Kaesong
corporations should take measures outside the courts to hold the corporations
accountable.

I.

INTRODUCTION

An hour’s car ride from Seoul into the demilitarized zone that divides
the Korean Peninsula into North and South Korea lies possibly the world’s
most heavily guarded Special Economic Zone (“SEZ”).1 The SEZ is
†

Juris Doctor and Masters in International Studies expected in 2009, University of Washington,
School of Law and The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. The author would like to thank
Ms. Patricia Goedde and Professor Joel Ngugi for their valuable guidance and suggestions on this
Comment. The author would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal
for their hard work and commitment. Any errors and omissions are the author’s own.
1
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NORTH KOREA: WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT THE KAESONG INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX 1 (2006) [hereinafter HRW], available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/korea1006/
korea1006web.pdf. A “Special Economic Zone” is defined as an area where enterprises are treated more
preferentially than in other areas in relation to such matters as the tax rate and the scope of operations in
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comprised of a collection of factories, ringed by security fences.2 This
fortress of factories is the Kaesong Industrial Park (“Kaesong”), the posterchild of North Korea’s “capitalist experiment.”3 Opened in 2004, Kaesong
boasts the sponsorship of the South Korean government and South Korean
companies such as Hyundai Asan.4 Work at Kaesong combines South
Korean technology and know-how with North Korean labor.5
The South Korean government sees Kaesong as the embodiment of
South Korea’s earnest efforts in overcoming the legacy of the Cold War and
pursuing a policy of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea.6
South Korea hopes that this economic partnership will push North Korea
toward economic reform and greater openness to the world.7 For both
Koreas, Kaesong also represents a cornerstone in the efforts towards the
eventual reunification of South and North Korea8 into the ethnically
homogeneous “Korean nation.”9
Recently, this particular inter-Korean relationship has drawn criticism
for egregious labor rights violations in Kaesong. Rights activists claim that
the North Korean government cheats the workers by not giving them their
full pay, by expecting them to work unpaid overtime, and by barring them
from forming labor unions.10 The United States government has labeled the
workers “trafficking victims”11 and claimed that Kaesong demonstrates that
South Korea economically supports the repressive Kim Jong-Il regime.12

order to attract foreign capital and advanced technology for modernization. See Sonoko Nishitateno,
China’s Special Economic Zones: Experimental Units for Economic Reform, 32 INT’L & COMP L.Q. 175,
176 (1983).
2
Norimitsu Onishi, South Brings Capitalism, Well Isolated, to North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2006, at A3.
3
Id.
4
HRW, supra note 1.
5
Jan Jettel, Kaesong Industrial Park Emerges as NK Human Rights Flashpoint, KOREA TIMES,
April 13, 2006, available at http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200604/kt2006041317270310220.htm.
6
See Welcome to the Ministry of Unification, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/english/EAM/
EAM0102I.jsp (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
7
Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2.
8
Id.
9
GI-WOOK SHIN, ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN KOREA: GENEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND LEGACY 3 (2006).
Both Koreas believe in a “ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis,” which declares that a politically
divided Korea must and will be reunified as Koreans are ethnically homogenous. Id. at 186.
10
HRW, supra note 1, at 6.
11
Christopher Carpenter, US Questions Legitimacy of Kaesong Wage System, KOREA TIMES, June 7
2006. A former Western diplomat has compared the working conditions at Kaesong to those of a “labor
camp.” Peter Ritter, Risky Business: Investing in North Korea Might Seem Like a Crazy Idea, but Some
Are Betting that Stronger Commercial Links Could Push the Hermit Kingdom Toward Reform, TIME,
October 22, 2007.
12
See State Dep’t Press Releases & Documents, Labor Contracts with North Korea Inadvisable,
U.S. Envoy Says, Jan. 16, 2007; Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2.
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The starting point of this Comment is the following statement on
Kaesong made by Human Rights Watch: “Seoul (and Pyongyang alike)
must ensure basic rights and protections of the North Korean workers.”13
This Comment argues that a judicial mandate from the South Korean
Constitutional Court can compel the South Korean government to recognize
the North Korean workers’ rights. The court has authority to extend its
jurisdiction over Kaesong workers. South Korean constitutional law offers
North Korean workers the opportunity to make a constitutional petition
based on an equal protection claim in the Constitutional Court. By granting
this petition, the court can compel the South Korean government to
recognize the workers’ rights and hold the offending South Korean
corporations accountable through regulations and sanctions.
However, filing this petition in South Korea is no straightforward
task. The workers are physically restricted to North Korean territory by the
North Korean state. Procedural barriers inherent in the South Korean legal
system compound this practical barrier. However, recent developments in
procedural law in other countries have facilitated rights actions against
transnational corporations in the individual corporation’s home country. The
South Korean legislature and the Constitutional Court should look to these
international trends in adopting procedural reforms that will allow the North
Korean workers to file a constitutional petition in the Constitutional Court.
Non-judicial measures in South Korea will complement the workers’
constitutional petition. For example, South Korea should make extant
governmental assistance to Kaesong corporations conditional upon a record
of good labor practices. Further, South Korean shareholders of violative
Kaesong corporations should use shareholder resolutions to compel
corporate authorities to protect workers’ rights.
This Comment proposes a comprehensive solution for Kaesong
workers to obtain legal redress for labor rights violations at Kaesong. Part II
of this Comment shows how Kaesong operations violate labor rights. Part
III argues that international guidelines place no legal obligation upon South
Korean corporations to protect Kaesong workers’ rights. Part IV advocates
that Kaesong workers be given the opportunity to seek redress by bringing
an equal protection claim in the South Korean Constitutional Court. Part V
shows that practical and procedural barriers will hinder the worker’s
potential suit. Part VI advocates that the Constitutional Court and the South
Korean legislature adopt international developments in procedural law to
13
Human Rights Watch, North Korea: Labor Rights at Risk in Joint Industrial Complex: South
Korean Companies Violate Labor Law, Oct. 3, 2006, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/
10/02/nkorea14284.htm.
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remove procedural barriers inherent in South Korean law. Part VII urges
that non-judicial measures be used also to hold offending corporations
accountable.
Part VIII acknowledges that the viability of these
recommendations depends on the political vicissitudes of foreign relations
between South Korea, North Korea, and the United States.
II.

BACKGROUND: LABOR VIOLATIONS TARNISH KAESONG AS A SYMBOL
OF INTER-KOREAN COOPERATION

The Kaesong SEZ is heralded as a shining example of North Korea’s
“capitalist experiment”14 and is a potent symbol of inter-Korean
cooperation.15 South Korea’s interest in the success and expansion of
Kaesong goes beyond mere economic gain as Kaesong also represents a step
forward in engaging North Korea and bringing stability to the Korean
peninsula.16 However, violations of the North Korean workers’ labor rights
at Kaesong taint this ambitious exercise of economic cooperation.17
A.

South Korea Sees Kaesong as a Significant Development in Peacefully
Engaging North Korea

The Kaesong SEZ opened in June 2004 and is located between the
North Korean city of Kaesong and the border between the two Koreas.18 It
was established through a contract between North Korea, the South Korean
Hyundai Asan Corporation, and South Korea’s state-owned Korea Land
Corporation.19 The North Korean workers at Kaesong produce goods such
as shoes, kitchenware, and clothes.20 These products are primarily intended
for the South Korean market.21 As of October 2007, twenty-six South
Korean companies had opened facilities at Kaesong, employing about
19,430 North Korean workers.22 Largely because of Kaesong’s productivity,
North Korean exports to the South increased by 63.3% in the first half of

14

See Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2.
Jettel, supra note 5.
Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2.
17
See HRW, supra note 1, at 1.
18
“Communist” Korea Violates Workers’ Rights, INDUS. WORKER (Indus. Workers of the World,
Cincinatti, Ohio), Nov. 1, 2006, at 12.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
The Associated Press, Inter-Korean Complex Surpasses U.S. $200 Million Worth of Goods, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 10, 2007.
15
16
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2007.23 South Korean officials have stated ambitious plans to expand the
SEZ to 2000 companies, employing 700,000 North Koreans.24
Kaesong was initiated with the blessing of South Korea’s previous
Kim Dae-Jung administration, and the current South Korean government
lauds it as a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation.25 South Korea’s President
Roh is convinced that progress in the economic development of North Korea
is a shortcut to democratization.26 Accordingly, President Roh earmarked
1.184 trillion won (approximately U.S. $1.27 billion) in the fiscal year 2005
for spending on North Korean economic cooperation, with emphasis on
developing Kaesong.27 This approach relates to the concept that peace on
the Korean peninsula and the prosperity of the Korean people are tied to
each other and trigger synergistic effects.28 Thus, Kaesong also represents
one of South Korea’s biggest efforts at engaging the North in de facto
unification.29
To these ambitious ends, the South Korean government has also
provided tax breaks and other support to both state and private South Korean
corporations in Kaesong.30 The South Korean government has actively
publicized the advantages of locating at Kaesong to South Korean
corporations.31 Among the main advantages are low labor costs and an
abundant labor force.32 Wage rates for North Korean workers are roughly
half the rates in comparable industries in China33 and provide a strong
incentive for Korean firms to locate at Kaesong.34
B.

Kaesong Operations Violate North Korean Workers’ Rights

Recently, rights activists and the United States government have
brought to light several forms of labor rights violations at Kaesong. The
23

Ritter, supra note 11.
Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2.
25
See Jettel, supra note 5. Kim Dae-Jung’s administration spanned between 1997 and December
2002.
See Kim Dae-Jung’s Tainted Legacy, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/
2590389.stm (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
26
Hiroshi Minegishi, South Korea Frontloading Larger Budget Helping North, NIKKEI WEEKLY,
Jan. 31, 2005.
27
Id.
28
MIN CHO, ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULAR AND THE OUTLOOK FOR
UNIFICATION 2 (2007).
29
Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2.
30
Id.
31
See generally, Welcome to the Ministry of Unification, supra note 6.
32
Id.
33
James Brooke, An Industrial Park in North Korea Nears a Growth Spurt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2006, at C5.
34
Jettel, supra note 5.
24
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most egregious violation alleged is that the North Korean government cheats
the North Korean workers of their full pay.35 Other allegations declare that
unions are banned36 and overtime work is unpaid.37
The taking of North Korean workers’ wages by the North Korean
government is a blatant violation of the Labor Regulations for the Gaeseong
Industrial Zone (“Kaesong Labor Law”) adopted in 2003 by the North
Korean state legislature.38 Article 25 of the Kaesong Labor Law stipulates
that North Korean workers must be paid a minimum of U.S. $50 per
month.39 Article 32 of the Kaesong Labor Law mandates that “each
enterprise,” including the South Korean companies at Kaesong, must pay
minimum wage to the workers directly in cash.40 However, Kaesong
companies pay the wages to a North Korean government labor broker.41
South Korean managers admit they have “no idea” how much of the salary is
passed on to the workers from the broker.42 Human Rights Watch reports
that the North Korean government takes thirty percent of the wages as a
mandatory contribution to a fund that provides the workers with free
housing, healthcare, and education.43 The U.S. State Department reports that
North Korea may be expropriating as much as forty-five percent of these
salaries44 and characterizes this practice as “forced labor” and the workers as
“trafficking victims.”45
Even though the payment of the mandatory fees is incorporated into
the Kaesong labor law, the manner in which the fees are taken away from
the workers’ wages violates that law. Article 42 of the Kaesong Labor Law
requires that each enterprise pay a monthly social insurance premium equal
to fifteen percent of its monthly payroll for North Korean citizens.46 Article
43 mandates that North Korean citizens will pay a “given portion” of their
monthly salaries towards a “social and cultural policy fee.”47 However, this
35

Id.; Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2; Brooke, supra note 33; HRW, supra note 1, at 1.
Jettel, supra note 5; Brooke, supra note 33.
Jettel, supra note 5.
38
Labor Regulations for the Gaeseong Industrial Zone (adopted as Decision No.2 by the Standing
Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Sept. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Kaesong Labor Regulations],
available at http://unikorea.go.kr/english/EUP/EUP0201R.jsp (follow “LIST” hyperlink; then follow
“article No. 22” hyperlink) (last visited Oct 26, 2007).
39
Id. art. 25; HRW, supra note 1, at 6.
40
Kaesong Labor Regulations, supra note 38, art. 32; HRW, supra note 1, at 6.
41
Brooke, supra note 33.
42
Id.
43
HRW, supra note 1, at 6.
44
State Dep’t Press Releases & Documents, supra note 12.
45
Carpenter, supra note 11.
46
Kaesong Labor Regulations, supra note 38, art. 42.
47
Id. art. 43.
36
37
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statutory language neither permits the South Korean companies to pay
wages to North Korean state officials nor permits the officials’ practice of
taking an indeterminate portion of those wages before the wages are handed
to the workers. While North Korea’s actions blatantly violate the Kaesong
Labor Law, state-run and private South Korean companies at Kaesong are
also complicit in these wrong-doings.
Labor rights violations at Kaesong also include prohibitions on union
formation and operation48 and the expectation that workers must work
unpaid overtime.49 Shortcomings in the Kaesong Labor Law have allowed
South Korean corporations and the North Korean government to commit
these violations with impunity.50 Although the Kaesong Labor Law
addresses certain workers’ rights, many of the most fundamental rights are
missing, including the right to freedom of association and collective
bargaining, the right to strike, the prohibition of sex discrimination and
sexual harassment, and the ban on harmful child labor.51 Thus, the on-going
violations at Kaesong raise the specter of other unreported violations.52
III.

INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES DIRECT BUT DO NOT REQUIRE SOUTH
KOREAN CORPORATIONS AT KAESONG TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF
NORTH KOREAN WORKERS

International codes of conduct for transnational corporations direct the
South Korean corporations at Kaesong to conform to international labor
rights standards. The current international codes of conduct are the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”) and the International Labor
Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises & Social Policy (“ILO Declaration”).53 While these guidelines
set ideal standards, they do not place a legal duty upon the corporations to
protect labor rights. Thus, as “soft law,”54 the OECD Guidelines and the
ILO Declaration place aspirational, but legally unenforceable, obligations
upon the South Korean corporations at Kaesong.
48
49
50

Jettel, supra note 5; HRW supra note 1, at 12.
Jettel, supra note 5.
North Korea: Labor Rights at Risk in Joint Industrial Complex, U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, Oct. 3,

2006.
51

HRW, supra note 1, at 2.
U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, supra note 50.
53
BINDA PREET SAHNI, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE LIABILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
INJURY 47 (2006).
54
In international law “soft law” constitutes “[g]uidelines, policy declarations, or codes of conduct
that set standards of conduct but are not legally binding.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
52
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A.

The OECD Guidelines Place Non-Enforceable Duties on South
Korean Corporations to Recognize Kaesong Workers’ Rights

Although Kaesong is situated in North Korean territory, South Korea
has a responsibility as a member of the OECD to ensure that South Korean
corporations respect international labor standards as laid out in OECD
Guidelines.55 The OECD Guidelines establish principles and standards that
cover a broad range of issues in business ethics including employment,
industrial relations, and human rights.56 Each country that is a member of
OECD is expected to recommend to multinationals headquartered in that
country to consider voluntarily adopting and complying with OECD
Guidelines.57 As a party to the OECD Convention since 1996, South Korea
has made a commitment to “align its economic system more closely with
international standards.”58 OECD Guidelines explicitly state, “where
corporate conduct and human rights intersect . . . [multinational enterprises]
are encouraged to respect human rights . . . in their dealings with
employees . . . in a manner that is consistent with host governments’
international obligations and commitments.”59 Because North Korea is party
to four main human rights treaties that protect workers’ rights, OECD
Guidelines thus direct South Korean companies in Kaesong to respect the
human rights of the North Korean workers.60 Furthermore, OECD
workplace guidelines include the right to free association and collective
bargaining61—rights that have been denied to Kaesong workers.62
However, the OECD Guidelines are aspirational and do not place a
binding legal obligation upon South Korean corporations. The guidelines
merely constitute an instrument of soft law.63 Consequently, the OECD
Guidelines do not provide the workers with a cause of action for legal relief.
55

HRW, supra note 1, at 5.
Theodora M. Lee & Littler Mendelson, Global Employment Claims: Emerging International
Labor and Employment Issues, in LITIGATION 2005, at 681 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. 730, PLI Order No. 6740, 2005).
57
Id.
58
Economist Intelligence Unit, South Korea: The Operating Environment, TMC.NET, Aug. 8, 2007,
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/08/08/2848638.htm.
59
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], The OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarifications 41 (rev. ed. 2000), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
60
HRW, supra note 1, at 4. North Korea is party to International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women and Convention on the Rights of the Child.
61
Lee & Mendelson, supra note 56.
62
See supra Part II.B
63
SAHNI, supra note 53, at 47.
56
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The ILO Declaration Requests but Does Not Require South Korean
Courts to Recognize Kaesong Workers’ Rights

The ILO Declaration is also a universal legal instrument that offers
guidelines to multinational corporations, employers, and workers’
organizations.64 It relates to such areas as employment, training, conditions
of work and life, and industrial relations.65 The ILO Declaration compels
the government of a member state to ensure that both multinational and
national enterprises66 meet the core labor standards of the ILO convention,
even if the government has not ratified the individual conventions that
enshrine these standards.67
Because the government of South Korea has been a “State Member of
the ILO” since 1991,68 the declaration compels the government to ensure
that South Korean Kaesong companies meet these labor standards.
However, much like the OECD Guidelines, the ILO Declaration does not
place any legal duties or liability upon the companies for their labor
violations at Kaesong. Instead, the instrument merely “invites” the actors
“to observe the principles embodied” in the ILO Declaration.69 Therefore,
the workers cannot rely on the ILO Declaration for a cause of action.
IV.

NORTH KOREAN WORKERS CAN POTENTIALLY SEEK REDRESS AND
PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS BY BRINGING AN EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM IN
THE SOUTH KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

“Soft law” such as the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Declaration
alone do not compel South Korean corporations to conform to just labor
practices at Kaesong. Therefore, it is important to ground the arguments for
just labor practices in laws that will force the South Korean government to
punish offending South Korean corporations. The most potent means to
these ends is to allow the North Korean workers to seek a constitutional
petition in the South Korean Constitutional Court, claiming that the North
Korean workers’ labor rights are protected under the South Korean
64
Int’l Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises & Social Policy, at v, (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter ILO Declaration].
65
Id.
66
Id. art. 37.
67
SAHNI, supra note 53, at 44. The core labor standards are freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining, elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, effective abolition of child
labor and elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation.
68
EQUITAS: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION, A UN ROAD MAP: A GUIDE
FOR PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS 131-34 (2d ed. 2004), available at
http://www.equitas.org/english/ed-manuals/un-road-map/ch-07-ILO-Member-States.pdf.
69
ILO Declaration, supra note 64, at 1.
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Constitution. This strategy seeks to place a legal duty upon the South
Korean government to recognize and protect the labor rights of the North
Korean workers. This obligation on the government, in turn, will compel the
government to hold South Korean corporations accountable through stricter
regulations and sanctions.
A.

South Korean Jurisprudence Suggests that North Korean Kaesong
Workers Are Protected Under the South Korean Constitution

South Korean constitutional jurisprudence indicates that South Korean
courts may extend constitutional protections to North Korean Kaesong
workers. Previously, South Korean courts have extended South Korean
nationality to North Koreans.70 The South Korean Supreme Court has ruled
that North Korea is part of the Korean peninsula and thus subject to the
sovereignty of South Korea.71 Therefore, North Korean residency does not
“interfere with the acquisition of the nationality of [South Korea].”72 The
South Korean government supports this judicial assertion of sovereignty
over North Korea: “[The Republic of Korea] does not recognize the
nationality of North Korea. Therefore, a resident of North Korea can be
considered as having [South Korean] nationality.”73 Thus North Koreans
may fall under the constitutional protections afforded to South Korean
citizens.74
Recent developments in relations between the Koreas make the
possibility of extending South Korean constitutional rights to North Koreans
more than just a legal theoretical possibility. In December 2004, the Roh
administration announced a policy change that those who hold “criminal
records” in North Korea will not be accepted into South Korea.75 The Vice
Unification Minister stated that those found to have committed crimes in
North Korea could be tried in South Korea, thus implying South Korean
jurisdiction over all of North Korea with regard to criminal acts.76 In light of
these events, a commentator raised the following question: “if South
70
Decision of August 31, 2000, 12-2 KCCR 167, 97 HunKa 12 (Korean Supreme Court) [hereinafter
Nationality Act Case].
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See Constitution of Republic Of Korea, ch. II, translated in MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT
LEGISLATION, ECONOMIC LAWS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN KOREA 47 (2004) (establishing the
constitutional rights and duties of South Korean citizens) [hereinafter Constitution of Republic of Korea).
75
David Scofield, Seoul’s Double-Talk on Reunification, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, MAY 1, 2004,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA04Dg01.html.
76
Id.
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Korea’s criminal code extends to those accused of crimes in the North, what
of the South Korean labor laws and human rights code?”77 Specifically,
since Kaesong workers are legally South Korean citizens under the South
Korean Constitution, “would it not be illegal to pay them salaries amounting
to less than one-tenth the nationally defined minimum wage?”78 The answer
is, arguably, yes. If the South Korean state accepts North Koreans as
citizens, then, as de jure citizens of South Korea, under the South Korean
Constitution, the North Korean Kaesong workers are entitled to the
protection of their “fundamental and inviolable human rights” by the South
Korean state.79
B.

An Equal Protection Claim in the South Korean Constitutional Court
Serves as a Basis for the North Korean Workers’ Potential Litigation

As de jure South Korean citizens, the North Korean workers may
bring a constitutional petition in the South Korean Constitutional Court
alleging violations of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Under
the Korean legal system, the main role of the Constitutional Court is “to
protect the individual constitutional rights of the Korean people.”80 The
South Korean Constitutional Court has held that the principle of equality
enshrined in Article 11(1) of the Constitution, which states that all citizens
shall be equal before the law,81 is the “supreme principle in the field of
protection of basic rights.”82 There are two prerequisites to bringing an
equal protection petition within the court’s jurisdiction. First, there must be
a present and direct harm to the petitioner. 83 Second, the petition must have
exhausted all ordinary remedies.84 A Kaesong workers’ petition would
satisfy both these prerequisites.

77

Id.
Id.
79
See Constitution of Republic Of Korea, supra note 74, ch. II, art. 10.
80
Jibong Lim, Korean Constitutional Court Standing at the Crossroads: Focusing on Real Cases
and Variational Types of Decisions, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 352 (2002).
81
See Constitution of Republic Of Korea, supra note 74, art. 11(1) (stating that all citizens shall be
equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on
account of gender, religion, or social status).
82
Decision of Nov 29, 2001, 13-2 KCCR 714, 99 Hun-Ma 494 (Korean Supreme Court) [hereinafter
Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans case].
83
Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 S.IL.U.L.J.
71, 91 (1997).
84
Id.
78
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The Workers Have Suffered “Present and Direct” Harm

The workers can demonstrate that they suffered “present and direct
harm” in Kaesong at the hands of the South Korean government. Through
its inaction, the South Korean government has failed to provide Kaesong
workers the same labor rights afforded to South Korean workers. This
failure resulted in the workers’ lost wages, uncompensated overtime pay, and
the inability to associate in labor unions.85
Article 68(1) of the South Korean Constitutional Court Act provides
that any person whose basic rights are infringed upon by exercise or nonexercise of governmental power may file a constitutional complaint before
the Constitutional Court.86 The “governmental power” in Article 68(1) that
is subject to constitutional adjudication refers to all powers including
legislative, judicial, and administrative.87 The North Korean workers may
file an equal protection petition with the Constitutional Court claiming that,
as South Korean nationals, they are denied the state protection granted to
workers in South Korea. Specifically, there is a complete lack of both
legislative and executive action to sanction South Korean corporations at
Kaesong that violate South Korean constitutional rights. Under South
Korean constitutional jurisprudence, the North Korean workers’
constitutional claim would constitute a “claim-right” that implicates a duty
of the state to take affirmative action benefiting claimants.88
2.

Ordinary Remedies Available to the Workers Are “Futile and
Impracticable”

The workers’ petition to the Constitutional Court will also satisfy the
second requirement that ordinary remedies be exhausted. The court has
relaxed this requirement, when it would be “futile or impracticable” to rely
on such remedies.89 The other remedies that would be available to the
workers would be to negotiate with the corporations at Kaesong to ensure
better working conditions,90 or to complain to North Korean judicial fora,
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See supra Part II.B.
Constitutional Court Act, art. 68(1), available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/
act.jsp (last visited Oct 23, 2007); Decision of Dec 24, 1997, 9-2 KCCR 842, 89 Hun-Ma 178 (Korean
Supreme Court).
87
Decision of Oct 15, 1990, 2 KCCR 365, 89 Hun-Ma 178 (Korean Supreme Court).
88
Decision of Sept 4, 1989, 1 KCCR 176, 88 Hun-Ma 22 (Korean Supreme Court).
89
Kyong Whan Ahn, supra note 83, at 92.
90
Kaesong Labor Regulations, supra note 38, art. 48.
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namely, the Kaesong labor tribunals91 and North Korean courts. However,
both of these means of redress are futile.
There are indications that Kaesong corporations have made no efforts
to hold their own operations accountable for labor violations and that these
corporations are comfortably complicit in the North Korean state’s
oppression of the workers. As the president of Dosco Co., a South Korean
Kaesong corporation, explained, “[i]f I can get good workers, I would build
factories anywhere, even if the country were ruled by a regime worse than
that of Kim Jong-Il.”92 Such attitude illustrates that companies may
prioritize profits over worker conditions.93 Accordingly, the workers may
not reliably expect redress and protection from their employer-corporation.
Similarly, seeking redress and protection in the North Korean judicial
system is not a realistic option for the workers. North Korean law is “a
derivative of North Korean party policy, [which is] a means to implement
State objectives.”94 Courts and other judicial fora are accountable to the
Supreme People’s Assembly (“SPA”) Presidium or to the SPA in session.95
Thus, there exists no independent North Korean judiciary.96 Furthermore,
individual rights are often not acknowledged in North Korean courts.97
Constitutional rights extend only to citizens who fulfill their duties to the
State.98 Due to the lack of independence of the North Korean courts from
the government and the lack of acknowledgment of individual rights by
those courts, a North Korean judicial forum will not provide a fair hearing to
the Kaesong workers’ labor complaints that would likely implicate
government actions such as siphoning salaries and disallowing labor unions.
C.

The South Korean State Has Denied Kaesong Workers Protection
Under Two Bodies of Law

The workers’ may assert an equal protection claim alleging that the
South Korean state has denied them protection under two bodies of law.
First, the workers could claim that the government has violated customary
91

Id.
Kim Hyo-jin, The Gaeseong Project: The Dream of ‘Dirt-Cheap’ Labor, JOON ANG DAILY, Nov.
2, 2003, available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/143.html.
93
SAHNI, supra note 53, at 275.
94
Patricia Goedde, Law “of Our Own Style”: The Evolution and Challenges of the North Korean
Legal System, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265, 1268 (2004).
95
Id. at 1276.
96
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2005), available at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61612.htm.
97
Id.
98
Goedde, supra note 94, at 1278.
92
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international law enshrined in the South Korean Constitution. Second, they
may claim that they are denied labor protections set forth in South Korean
labor statutes and the Constitution.
1.

The Workers Are Denied Protection Under International Law

The North Korean workers may claim that the South Korean state has
not protected their labor rights granted under customary international law.
Labor rights are human rights as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”) includes standards for various labor rights.99 These labor rights
include the rights of assembly and association,100 freedom of movement,101
freedom from slavery,102 freedom from discrimination,103 and freedom from
unjust labor practices,104 which specifically refers to the right to join trade
unions.105 These rights are universal and restrict states, individuals, and
corporations from infringing on human rights.106 Thus, labor rights are
enshrined in the UDHR.107 Even though the UDHR has no formal legally
binding effect, it is generally accepted that the human rights principles of the
UDHR have attained the status of customary international law and are
binding upon all states.108
The South Korean state violates customary international law by
failing to ensure the North Korean workers’ rights to just and favorable
remuneration.109 Specifically, South Korea has a duty to ensure that the
workers are not denied their rightful wages by the North Korean state and
the South Korean corporations.110 Also, if the workers are “trafficking
victims,”111 they are subjected to “forced labor” and are thus denied their
99
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.Y.B. 535, art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/810, U.N. Sales
No. 1950.I.II (1948-49) [hereinafter UDHR].
100
See id. art. 20.
101
See id. art. 13.
102
See id. art. 4.
103
See id. art. 7
104
See id. art. 23.
105
See id. art. 23(4).
106
John C. Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA.
LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 467 (2000).
107
Id.
108
Barbara Macgrady, Note, Resort to International Human Rights Law in Challenging Conditions in
U.S. Immigration Detention Centers, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 271, 289 (1997) (citing U.N. ESCOR Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., Preliminary Report by the Special Representative of the Commission on the Human Rights
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/20 (1985)). “Customary
International Law” is a building block of the international legal system that derives from the practice of
states and is accepted by them as legally binding. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
109
See UDHR, supra note 99, art. 23.
110
See supra Part II. B.
111
Carpenter, supra note 11.

JANUARY 2008

LABOR LITIGATION ACROSS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE

279

freedom from slavery.112 Furthermore, since the Kaesong Labor Law does
not explicitly grant the other labor rights in the UDHR, such as the right to
freedom of association and collective bargaining, the right to strike, the
prohibition of sex discrimination and sexual harassment,113 there may be
other actionable rights violations.114
According to Article 6 of the South Korean Constitution, customary
international law has the same effect as Korean domestic law.115 The
Constitutional Court has confirmed that “international law that is generally
approved” is a constituent element of the Constitution.116 The court has
previously considered customary international law as the basis for the
protection of South Korean citizens’ rights.117 Accordingly, the Kaesong
workers may invoke Article 6 of the South Korean Constitution and base
their constitutional claims on the UDHR as customary international law.
Since the ILO Declaration and OECD Guidelines direct governments
as well as corporations to follow international labor standards,118 these
international instruments may also be invoked when appealing to protection
under international law. Even as “soft law,” the principles in these
instruments can help establish a normative structure of international labor
rights to aid the court.119 Thus, the constitutional petition would be bolstered
by the persuasive effect of these non-binding guidelines.
2.

The Workers Are Denied Protection Under South Korean Labor Law

The Kaesong workers may also claim that they are denied protection
under South Korean labor law statutes. The Labor Standards Act stipulates
minimum working standards, such as the direct payment of wages to

112

See UDHR, supra note 99, art. 4.
HRW, supra note 1, at 2.
114
U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, supra note 50.
115
Young-Sok Kim, A Korean Perspective on the International Criminal Court and Universal
Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN KOREAN PERSPECTIVE 341-42 (Choon-Hyun Paik ed., 2004).
116
Decision of May 14, 2004, 16-1 KCCR 609, 2004 Hun-Na 12 (Korean Supreme Court)
[hereinafter Impeachment of the President (Roh Moo-hyun) Case]
117
Decision of April 25, 2002, 14-1 KCCR 351, 98 Hun-Ma 425 (Korean Supreme Court)
[hereinafter Pledge to Abide by the Law Case] (customary international law was invoked as a primary basis
for the protection of the freedom of conscience in a recent dissenting opinion in the Constitutional Court);
see also Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case supra note 82 (Both the South
Korean government and the dissenting judges invoked “general principles of public international law” to
advocate for the Past Nationality Principle as the basis for citizenship. They both argued that a Jus
Sanguinis basis would amount to discrimination of individuals based on race or nationality.)
118
See supra Part III.
119
See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS 89 (2002).
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workers120 and restrictions on extended work.121 Kaesong operations violate
these provisions as the workers’ salaries are not directly handed to them and
they are expected to work unpaid overtime.122 Because Kaesong operations
ban unionization, they also violate the Trade Union and Labor Relations
Adjustment Act, which grants the right to unionize.123
The North Korean workers may also claim that they have not been
afforded equal protection to enjoy the labor rights explicitly granted in the
South Korean Constitution. The Constitution includes the right to
“independent association, collective bargaining and collective action.”124
The Constitution also provides protection for a “minimum wage system
under the conditions as prescribed by Act.”125 The “Act” in a Kaesong
worker’s case would be the Kaesong Labor Law, which the South Korean
government and corporations violate by not paying the workers directly.126
Thus, the worker’s equal protection claim may appeal to protection under
labor law statutes as well as the labor law provisions in the Constitution.
V.

PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL BARRIERS STAND BETWEEN KAESONG
WORKERS AND THEIR POTENTIAL LITIGATION EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH
KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Opening the doors of the South Korean Constitutional Court to
transnational rights litigation is no straightforward task. Both practical and
procedural barriers hinder Kaesong workers’ potential litigation in South
Korea. First, Kaesong workers face severe penalties under North Korean
law if they attempt to leave the state for purposes of pursuing litigation in
South Korea. Second, the significance of this state-imposed barrier is
heightened by Constitutional Court procedure that bars third parties from
representing the Kaesong workers in court. Third, South Korean law does
not establish clear jurisdiction over Kaesong workers. Fourth, South Korean
law does not permit workers to file suits anonymously, which deters laborrelated suits for fear of adverse employment action, such as retaliatory
120
See Labor Standards Act, ch. III art. 42, Act No. 6974 (Sep. 15, 2003) (S. Korea), translated in
MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, ECONOMIC LAWS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN KOREA 1883
(2004).
121
See id. at ch. IV 1885.
122
See supra Part II.B.
123
See Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, ch. II, Act No. 6456 (Mar. 28, 2001) (S.
Korea), translated in MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, ECONOMIC LAWS ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN KOREA 1912 (2004).
124
See Republic Of Korea Constitution supra note 74, art. 33.
125
Id. art. 32.
126
See supra Part II.B.

JANUARY 2008

LABOR LITIGATION ACROSS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE

281

termination. These practical and procedural hurdles obstruct the workers’
transnational rights litigation in the Constitutional Court.
A.

The Workers Will Be Barred from Leaving North Korea to Pursue
Litigation

The North Korean workers will be unable to pursue litigation in South
Korea because North Korean law prohibits the unauthorized departure of
North Korean citizens from the state.127 North Koreans who “illegally”
cross or help others in crossing the North Korean border face penalties.128 A
person who illegally crosses “a frontier of the Republic” faces a sentence of
up to three years in a kwalliso, a political penal labor colony.129 Further, an
official with the “frontier administration” who helps “someone to violate a
frontier” faces a sentence in a kwalliso for a period of between two and
seven years.130
It is unclear under what conditions North Korean authorities would
allow North Koreans to leave the country. However, the fact that tens of
thousands risk these heavy penalties by crossing into China’s northeastern
provinces in search of food131 indicates that the authorities are not willing to
authorize North Koreans to depart even to fulfill basic needs such as food.
Thus, North Korean authorities will not likely authorize departure to pursue
litigation abroad in which the North Korean state is implicated in the wrongs
that are the focus of the litigation.
B.

Constitutional Court Procedure Bars Third Parties from Representing
the Workers

Compounding the immobility of the Kaesong workers, South Korean
Constitutional Court procedure bars third parties in South Korea from filing
the constitutional petition on behalf of the workers.
Specifically,
Constitutional Court procedure requires that “[a] constitutional complaint
can only be filed by individuals whose basic rights have been violated.”132 A
127
Amnesty Int’l, Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea), AI Index ASA 24/003/2004, Jan. 17, 2004, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa240032004.
128
Id.
129
The North Korean law which prohibits unauthorized departure is in clear breach of the
fundamental right to leave one’s own country. art. 12(2) of the ICCPR, to which North Korea is a state
party, states that “(e)veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.” Id.
130
Many who fled to countries like China and were forcibly returned to North Korea were subjected
to punishment including arbitrary detention, forced labor, and, in some cases, the death penalty. Id.
131
Id.
132
Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case, supra note 82.
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person whose basic right has been violated “does not include a third party
who only has indirect, practical, or economic interest in the matter.”133 The
court thus places the burden on the petitioner that he or she is the “bearer” of
the basic rights at issue.134
The inability to have South Korean third parties file the petition on
behalf of the North Korean workers and the requirement that the workers
demonstrate that they are, in fact, the bearers of the rights at issue create
barriers to filing a constitutional petition. Constitutional Court procedure
requires that, in order to file a constitutional petition the North Korean
workers would have to acquire the services of a qualified attorney.135
Further, the workers (along with the attorney) would have to make written
submissions to the court on such matters as the claimants’ and their
attorney’s identities, the allegedly infringed right, and the exercise or nonexercise of public power that gave rise to the rights infringement.136
Contacting and hiring an attorney who will take their case to the South
Korean Constitutional Court and completing the necessary administrative
procedures such as making the written submissions pose practical difficulties
to the North Korean workers. The “qualified attorney”137 that the North
Korean workers will have to acquire will likely be an attorney currently in
South Korea.138 While average North Koreans cannot leave the country in
order to pursue litigation,139 they also have few channels of communication
with the outside world due to North Korean governmental restrictions on
freedom of expression.140 For example, the government has banned the use

133

Decision of April 29, 2004, 16-1 KCCR 601, 2003 Hun-Ma 81 (Korean Supreme Court).
Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case, supra note 82.
135
For cases in which the party is a private person, it is impossible for the Constitutional Court to
make a request for judgment or conduct oral proceedings without the person’s representing attorney, unless
the private person himself is a qualified attorney. In the event private persons have no financial resources to
nominate an attorney to be their representative, they may request the Constitutional Court to nominate a
court-designated attorney. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE IN KOREA 29 (1990). See also Constitutional Court Act, art. 25(3) (Legal Representative), art. 70
(Court Appointed Counsel), available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english (follow “Constitutional
Court Act” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
136
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN KOREA
36 (1990); Constitutional Court Act, supra note 86, art. 71(1) (Matters to Be Stated On Written Request).
137
See Constitutional Court Act, supra note 86, art. 25(3) (Legal Representative).
138
A “qualified attorney” is an attorney, who has passed the South Korean Bar exam and spent two
years at the Judicial Research and Training Institute, which is run by the Supreme Court. Asia Pacific Legal
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1136&l5country_code=sk&l5directory=as500&Itemid=398 (last visited Oct 23, 2007).
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See supra Part V.A.
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of cell phones141 and restricted internet access to high-ranking officials and
other designated elites.142 Thus, these government restrictions on the
workers’ contact with the outside world severely impairs their ability to
acquire the representation of a qualified attorney who can file their
constitutional petition in the Constitutional Court and collaborate with that
attorney to fulfill other procedural requirements such as producing written
submissions.
C.

South Korean Law Does Not Establish Clear Jurisprudence over
North Koreans

Despite theoretical legal arguments and supporting international
relations developments,143 there is no well-established South Korean
jurisprudence on transnational litigation that allows for South Korean
jurisdiction over North Koreans. As explained above in Part V, the South
Korean Constitutional Court may have jurisdiction over Kaesong worker
claims for constitutional violations.144 This ambiguity over jurisdiction is
heightened by South Korea’s stance that diplomatic tensions with North
Korea will worsen if South Korean courts place North Koreans under South
Korean jurisdiction.145 Indeed, in spite of the unprecedented boom in
constitutional adjudication at the Constitutional Court, the court has shown
substantial reservation with regard to such cases with highly political
implications.146 Thus, the Constitutional Court may well dismiss the
litigation for lack of jurisdiction over the North Korean workers.
D.

Constitutional Court Procedure Does Not Allow for Suit Under
Pseudonyms

Because the court requires the individuals to prove that they are the
bearer of rights at issue,147 the Kaesong workers cannot mask their identity.
The South Korean procedural rules do not allow for pseudonyms to protect
the identities of the workers.148 This may leave the petitioner-workers
141
North Korea Bans Mobile Phones, TEXTUALLY.ORG, June 4, 2004, http://www.textually.org/
textually/archives/2004/06/004040.htm.
142
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 96.
143
See supra Part IV.A.
144
See supra section V.A.
145
See Nationality Act Case, supra note 70.
146
DAE-KYU YOON, RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 42 (2000).
147
Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case, supra note 82.
148
See Constitutional Court Act, supra note 86, art. 71(1) (“Matters to Be Stated On Written
Request” include “Indication of the complainant and his counsel” and provides no provision for filing
under pseudonyms).
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vulnerable to retaliatory termination of employment or other punitive action
from either the North Korean state or employer corporations upon the
workers’ return to Kaesong.
VI.

SOUTH KOREA MUST FOLLOW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION TO SUBJECT CORPORATIONS TO SUIT FOR
KAESONG LABOR VIOLATIONS

In light of the significant problems barring Kaesong workers from
vindicating their labor rights, the South Korean Constitutional Court and the
South Korean legislature should adopt a new set of domestic procedural
rules to facilitate actions that hold South Korean corporations accountable
for unjust labor practices at Kaesong and other extra-territorial economic
operations. The procedural barriers inherent in the South Korean judicial
system largely contribute to this denial of judicial consideration of Kaesong
workers’ rights violations.
However, international developments in
transnational litigation demonstrate ways to circumvent or overcome such
barriers and allow courts to consider extraterritorial rights violations
committed by corporations incorporated within its jurisdiction.
A.

The South Korean Legislature and the Constitutional Court Have the
Capacity to Amend the Procedural Rules of the Constitutional Court
to Accommodate Kaesong Workers’ Litigation

Both the legislature and the Constitutional Court have the capacity to
amend the Constitutional Court’s procedure. After the court was established
in 1988, the legislature defined the procedural role of the Constitutional
Court by passing the Constitutional Court Act.149 While the Constitution
briefly mentions the powers and the functions of the court,150 the
Constitutional Court Act elaborates upon these powers and functions.151
Thus, the legislature can alter the court’s procedure within the bounds set by
the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court defines its own procedure by making
regulations and by liberally constructing extant procedural requirements.
The court has the authority to make regulations to manage its own affairs,
including its own procedures for adjudication—as long as they do not

149

Kyong Whan Ahn, supra note 83, at 75-76.
See Constitution of the Republic of Korea, supra note 74, arts. 111-13.
151
Id. See also Constitutional Court Act, supra note 86, ch. IV (includes detailed procedural rules
set forth in chapters on “General Procedure of Adjudication” and “Special Adjudication Procedures”).
150
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exceed the bounds of the Constitutional Court Act.152 The court has also
employed many new techniques in pursuing its intention to “safeguard the
constitution” and to “protect the fundamental rights of the people.”153 These
techniques include liberally constructing procedural rules such as
“justiciability requirements.”154 Thus, the court itself can take measures to
alter its procedural rules.
The South Korean legislature and the Constitutional Court have the
capacity to change the procedural rules of the Constitutional Court.
Therefore both the legislature and the court must look to the following
international trends in transnational litigation in crafting procedural rules
that would allow the North Korean Kaesong workers to pursue litigation in
the Constitutional Court.
B.

South Korea Should Follow Developments in South Asian Public
Interest Litigation to Relax Standing Requirements and Allow Third
Party Suits

The North Korean workers, whose freedom of movement is severely
circumscribed by the North Korean state, face a formidable barrier in
pursuing litigation in the South Korean Constitutional Court because
standing rules require the injured party itself to file suit and bar third party
suits.155 Public interest litigation in South Asia, especially in India, provides
a procedural model to circumvent this problem. South Asian courts have
encouraged third party litigation on behalf of “those without the capacity to
sue.”156
Indian courts have relaxed the requirement that a litigant must be
present in court to sue where there is an overriding public need. The seminal
Indian Supreme Court judgment in S.P Gupta v. Union of India established
that the strict rule of locus standi157 changes “[when] there has been a
violation of the constitutional or legal rights of persons who by reason of
their socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach
152

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 15 (1996).
Kyong Whan Ahn, supra note 83, at 88.
Id. These requirements are substantially similar to the justiciability requirements under art. 3 of
the U.S. Constitution. That the Court has made a lax reading of these requirements is portrayed by its
holding that in some instances, such as when the danger of repeated infringement exists, ruling on the
merits is necessary even when the justiciability requirements have expired. Id. at 91.
155
See supra Part V.B.
156
SAHNI, supra note 53, at 294 (citing Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 S.C.C.
161 at para. 11).
157
Latin for "place of standing," locus standi means the right to bring an action or to be heard in a
given forum. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
153
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the Court for judicial redress.”158 Under this principle, the “reasons” that
make a person unable to approach a court for relief include “poverty,
helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged
position.”159
When such circumstances are present, the court asserted that any third
party member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate
direction, order, or writ.160 Thus, lawyers, public interest groups, social
workers, and journalists would be able to file a bona fide plea on behalf of
those who could not access the court.161 The Indian Supreme Court has
further extended this principle by accepting letters or newspaper petitions.162
This principle has also been adopted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan163
and has been considered in Bangladeshi courts.164
Equitable considerations of fair access to justice compel South Korea
to adopt a similar relaxed rule on locus standi. As mentioned before,165 such
equitable considerations are important because the constitutional petition in
the Constitutional Court carries overtones of an equitable remedy.166 The
Constitutional Court and the South Korean legislature should change
Constitutional Court procedure to ease current standing rules and allow for
third parties to file suit on behalf of the North Korean workers. Doing so
will allow concerned third parties in South Korea to file suit on the workers’
behalf. These concerned parties could potentially include the South Korean
branch of Human Rights Watch,167 human rights lawyers from “Lawyers for
Democratic Society,”168 and North Korean dissident groups.169

158
Parvez Hassan & Azim Azfar, Securing Environmental Rights Through Public Interest Litigation
in South Asia, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 226-27 (2004).
159
Id. at 227.
160
Id.
161
SAHNI, supra note 53, at 294 (citing SP Gupta v. President of India (1982) A.I.R. S.C. 149, 192).
162
Id.
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Hassan & Azfar, supra note 158 at 233.
164
Id. at 242-44.
165
See supra Part V.
166
Kyong Whan Ahn, supra note 83, at 77.
167
Human Rights Watch has documented the abuses at Kaesong and has called for action to end those
abuses. See generally HRW, supra note 1.
168
DAE-KYU YOON, supra note 146, at 42. Formed in 1987, this organization comprises of members
of the Korean Bar Association and has become the center of public interest activities, including
constitutional litigation.
169
Certain dissidents have spoken out against the Kaesong abuses. See Jettel, supra note 5.
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South Korea Should Follow Developments in the European Union and
United States to Extend Court Jurisdiction to Hear Extraterritorial
Constitutional Claims Against Domestically Owned Corporations

Although the South Korean Constitutional Court may construe
jurisdiction over North Koreans in North Korea,170 there is no established
rule to this effect. Lack of jurisdiction over extraterritorial violations of the
Korean Constitution may prove fatal to the viability of the Kaesong workers’
potential litigation. However, legal developments in the European Union
and the United States indicate that there is a growing trend in transnational
litigation that overcomes such jurisdictional barriers.
For example, as an E.U. member-state, the United Kingdom’s courts
are bound by the Brussels Regulation, which permits a company to be sued
at its place of domicile—either the location of its statutory seat, central
administration, or principal place of business.171 English common law has
interpreted these provisions to conform with Article 2 of the Brussels
Convention, which provides that an action must be brought in the
defendant’s domicile.172 Recently, the House of Lords has passed legislation
permitting U.K. courts to hear compensation claims from claimants
demanding the accountability of transnational corporations for torts
committed in foreign countries.173
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has extended its jurisdictional
reach to plaintiffs domiciled in a state not party to the Brussels
Convention.174
The ECJ’s holding provides a codified system for
determining jurisdiction, and favors the employee as the weaker party.175
Thus, the ECJ has effectively precluded the application of forum non
conveniens if a defendant is based in the European Union.176
In the United States, the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) is a means
of holding corporations liable for international human rights violations.177
The ATCA expressly provides U.S. district courts with original jurisdiction
over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”178 The Ninth Circuit in
170
See supra Part V. A & B (discussion on the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction over the North
Korean workers).
171
SAHNI, supra note 53, at 22-23 (citing Council Regulation, 2000, E.C. 2001/44 (U.K.)).
172
Id. at 23.
173
Id. at 24.
174
Id. at 23-24.
175
BOB HEPPLE, LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 162 (2005).
176
SAHNI, supra note 53, at 23.
177
HEPPLE, supra note 175, at 161.
178
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1996). See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d Cir. 1980).

288

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 1

Doe v. Unocal Corp. held that forced labor is among the “handful of
crimes . . . to which the law of nations attributes individual liability” such
that state action is not required.179 This suit concerned human rights
violations during Unocal’s construction of a pipeline in Myanmar. Unocal
eventually settled the case in 2004.180 A lawyer for the Myanmar villagers
stated that the settlement would help “develop programs to improve living
conditions, health care and education and protect the rights of people from
the pipeline region.”181 The effect of the suit on Unocal was substantial even
before it agreed to the settlement. The suit had created uncertainty in
Unocal’s future investing and was a costly disruption in its operations.182
The negative publicity that arose from the case was also expected to damage
the company’s brand equity.183
Even though no verdicts have been officially rendered against
companies for extraterritorial torts under the ATCA, corporations are
reacting to the possible impact of such litigation.184 ATCA suits compel the
corporations to consider the importance of complying with human rights
laws in making their investment decisions.185 For example, ChevronTexaco
ended its oil development in Ecuador following a lawsuit that was eventually
dismissed by a federal judge.186 A ChevronTexaco official stated that the
litigation was not a “positive indicator” for Ecuador as a venue for continued
business, and that the threat of similar litigation adds an element of risk that
makes the corporation less competitive.187 Thus, whatever the outcome of
the litigation, the very fact that plaintiffs are given the opportunity to be
heard in court is an important mechanism to hold a corporation accountable.
The South Korean legislature and Constitutional Court must look to
these jurisdictional developments in E.U. and U.S. law as normative models
that facilitate transnational litigation in domestic courts. Both the legislature
and the Constitutional Court should accordingly enact regulations that would
allow for constitutional petitions from foreign litigants injured by the actions
of South Korean corporations. The adoption of the procedural principles in
179
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these models will allow for North Korean Kaesong workers to sue the South
Korean corporations in the Constitutional Court.
D.

South Korea Should Follow the Model Established by U.S. Law That
Allows Litigants to Maintain Anonymity in Labor Rights Cases

Because Constitutional Court procedure does not provide for suit
under pseudonyms,188 North Korean workers would be vulnerable to
retaliation from both the South Korean employers and the North Korean
state for bringing rights litigation in South Korea. Thus, in order to protect
the workers from such negative repercussions, it is vital that the petitionerworkers’ identities be protected.
A landmark labor rights case in the United States has demonstrated
that suit under pseudonyms is an essential component in international labor
rights litigation.189 Recently, the U.S. Ninth Circuit found that foreign
employees can anonymously bring suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act
when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs both prejudice to opposing
party and public interest in knowing the party’s identity.190 The claimants in
this case were mostly Chinese garment workers in Saipan, a commonwealth
of the United States.191 The Ninth Circuit allowed the workers to use
pseudonyms in place of their actual names because they feared that, if their
identities were disclosed to defendants and other nonparties to the action,
they would be fired from their jobs, deported, and subsequently arrested and
imprisoned by the People’s Republic of China.192
Similarly, the South Korean Constitutional Court and the legislature
must adopt such procedural rules that ensure anonymity of plaintiff-workers
in order to protect Kaesong workers from retaliation by South Korean
employers or the North Korean government. The Constitutional Court
should permit anonymity to any claimant who can demonstrate the
reasonable likelihood or fear of retaliation to file anonymously.
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VII. MEASURES OUTSIDE THE COURTS WILL ALSO PROMOTE GREATER
ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE SOUTH KOREAN CORPORATIONS
A constitutional petition from Kaesong workers would require the
Constitutional Court and legislature to pursue progressive implementation of
developments in transnational litigation. Moreover, litigation alone does not
address the urgency of protecting the North Korean workers from ongoing
labor rights violations. Therefore, the South Korean government and the
South Korean public must take measures outside of the courts to achieve
expeditious results. Two prominent and potentially effective measures
outside the courts would be halting South Korean government assistance to
corporations that commit rights violations and initiating shareholder pressure
on Kaesong corporations that violate constitutional rights. These measures
complement changes to the court’s jurisdiction and should be pursued
contemporaneously. They will foster an environment of accountability,
which the Constitutional Court can eventually build upon when adjudicating
the workers’ claims. Thus, these extra-judicial measures effectively lay the
ground for a potentially successful litigation of the Kaesong workers’ rights.
A.

Cutting Off Government Assistance Is an Effective Means of Holding
Violative Corporations Accountable

The South Korean government should consider halting the assistance
currently given to corporations that violate the labor rights of the Kaesong
workers. The government should make the support it provides individual
South Korean Kaesong corporations conditional upon the corporation’s
showing of a good corporate social responsibility record. Thus, the large tax
breaks and publicity that the South Korean government provides193 must be
halted immediately to those corporations complicit in the Kaesong
violations.
This recommendation follows from Canadian efforts to strengthen
corporate social responsibility. In pursuing stronger corporate social
responsibility in its transnational mining industry, the Canadian government
considered linking the provision of government services to businesses,
including export and project financing, to their adherence to corporate social
responsibility standards.194 These standards aim at achieving a sustainable
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balance of benefits for business, employees, stakeholders, and the
communities and the environment within which the business operates.195
Enforcement of corporate social responsibility standards in North
Korea may be difficult to implement. While the Canadian government had
“National Contact Points,” which investigated corporate social responsibility
violations in the countries where its corporations functioned,196 the South
Korean government has no such investigatory contact point in North Korea.
Further, the North Korean state will not likely allow such an entity in
Kaesong. Independent monitoring agencies will likely be denied access into
the tightly-secured SEZ. Thus, it will be difficult for the South Korean
government to discern which corporations should be deprived of government
assistance. Nonetheless, placing a burden upon corporations to show good
corporate practices as a condition to government assistance may compel the
corporations to improve the conditions at Kaesong.
B.

Shareholder Pressure Is an Effective Means of Holding Violative
Corporations Accountable

South Korean shareholders of the Kaesong corporations must take
advantage of such instruments as shareholder resolutions to hold offending
corporations accountable. In the United States, through shareholder
resolutions placed before corporate directors, shareholders increasingly call
for companies to pull out of projects implicated in human rights law suits.197
For example, responding to a shareholder resolution and negative publicity
from a pending human rights law suit, Calgary-based Talisman Energy sold
its U.S. $770 million stake in an oil development project in Sudan.198
Under South Korean law, shareholders have statutory authority to
control certain aspects of the company through such mechanisms as the right
to vote and binding shareholder resolutions.199 Shareholders can discipline
the company by such acts as electing or removing directors,200 merging or
dissolving the corporation,201 and transferring the whole or an important part
of business.202 Thus, statutorily, shareholders have substantial control over
the activities of a corporation.
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Recent legal reform in corporate governance in South Korea has led to
a rise in shareholder activism.203 Such activist efforts have been headed by
non-governmental organizations such as chamyeoyundai (the Participatory
Economic Committee of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy),
which act on behalf of shareholders204 by revealing companies with low
accountability.205 With the support of the South Korean government, such
civic organizations have taken on the role of whistleblowers that strive to
prevent managerial abuse and improve transparency and efficiency.206
South Korean shareholders and their representative civic organizations
must take advantage of this climate of promoting corporate accountability
and extend their activism to the advocacy of responsible labor practices in
Kaesong. Thus, shareholder activism presents an effective means in the
hands of the South Korean public to hold the Kaesong corporations
accountable for labor rights violations.
VIII. BROADER POLITICAL REALITIES WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN
REALIZING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS
The feasibility of recommendations to hold South Korean
corporations accountable both inside and outside the courts must be seen in
light of the political realities of the Korean peninsula. On the one hand,
tense relations between the North and the South pose a formidable barrier to
implementing these recommendations. On the other hand, U.S. pressure on
South Korea to cease economic support to the North may favor such
implementation.
The South Korean government states that although it is frustrated with
the North Korea’s refusal to halt its nuclear ambitions, it sees no other option
but to engage them.207 It believes that ending cooperative projects will only
worsen inter-Korean relations and increase the danger of military clashes on
the divided Korean peninsula.208 Thus, if South Korea were to hold Kaesong
corporations accountable for labor violations in which North Korea is also
complicit, then such a move would likely be viewed by North Korea as
203
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adversarial or, at least, uncooperative. This could potentially undo the good
relations that have developed between the two Koreas since the Sunshine
Policy was instituted in 2000. It is possible that the Constitutional Court of
South Korea will defer to the South Korean government’s policy to pacify
the North and deny suit to Kaesong workers.209
On the other hand, pressure from the United States on South Korea to
halt funding of North Korean human rights abuses is at the fore of the
ongoing developments in a free trade agreement (“FTA”) between South
Korea and the U.S. While South Korea wants Kaesong products to be
recognized as “Made in South Korea,” U.S. officials and lawmakers have
not been receptive, raising questions about labor standards and reports that
the North Korean state is siphoning the workers’ wages.210 Kaesong posed a
persistent obstacle in the preliminary FTA negotiations between the two
countries.211 As the FTA now awaits ratification in the U.S. Congress, the
disagreement on Kaesong remains unresolved.212 Some U.S. officials claim
that South Korea, in partnering with North Korea to establish Kaesong, is
prolonging the life of the Kim Jong-Il regime at the expense of the North
Korean people.213 The Bush administration’s special envoy for human rights
in North Korea stated that projects like Kaesong strengthened Kim Jong-Il
by pumping hundreds of millions of dollars into the North.214 The
administration accused the South of economically propping up the North, as
the United States financially squeezed the North elsewhere.215 Thus, an
attempt by South Korea to follow the above recommendations with a view to
holding violative corporations accountable may ease the roadblocks
surrounding Kaesong in the ongoing FTA developments.
It is difficult to surmise which one of these countervailing pressures
upon South Korea is stronger. Such political forces unpredictably ebb and
flow on the volatile Korean Peninsula. These broader political realities
influence whether Kaesong workers can look to South Korea for redress to
and protection from the violation of their labor rights.
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CONCLUSION

If unification of the two Koreas is South Korea’s ultimate goal in
building a peace regime through inter-Korean cooperation,216 then South
Korea must see all Koreans as equal and extend to North Koreans the rights
currently granted to South Koreans. However, the South Korean state has
neglected to address the violations against the North Korean workers at
Kaesong. Kaesong is of particular importance in the larger struggle for
human rights in North Korea, as it is one of the few areas where South
Korea exercises some political leverage over the North Korean
government.217 Allowing the Kaesong workers to pursue a constitutional
petition in the South Korean Constitutional Court will be a significant
advance towards South Korea’s lofty goal of bridging the Cold War divide
on the Korean peninsula.
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